Wikipedia:Sandbox

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Wikipedia:Sandpit)

CASE STUDY OF FRATRICIDE INCIDENT OCCURRED ON 12.01.2017 AT NPGCL NABINAGAR

INTRODUCTION:- 

Nabinagar Power Generating Company Limited (NPGCL) is a joint venture of NTPC and Bihar State Power Holding Corporation Limited (Bihar Govt). It is located in Aurangabad district of Bihar which is a Naxal affected area and a crime prone belt. The plant is in construction stage at present. It is a coal base super thermal power plant having an optimum capacity of 1980 MW in 1st phase (3 units of 660 MW capacities each). The plant is proposed to be extended in 2nd phase also of 2400 MW (having 3 units of 800 MW each).

Security wing of CISF was inducted on 12.11.2014 with sanctioned strength of 227. Total 159 CISF personnel were posted at the time of incident.

CRUX OF THE CASE:-

On dated 12.01.2017 at about 12.40 hrs, Ex Constable Balveer Singh, who was detailed for Quarter Guard duty and was taking rest in old barrack after his duty, opened indiscriminate firing with his 5.56 mm INSAS rifle. Four CISF personnel, who were assembling for B shift duty were killed in the firing. Later he was overpowered by HC/GD Rajesh Singh.

AC/Exe Sh. Ajit Toppo was holding the charge of unit commander at the time of incident as the unit commander was out of station to attend a course. AC/Exe Sh. Ajit Toppo was inside main office at the time of incident. After getting information of indiscriminate firing by Ex CT/GD Balveer Singh, one of the Constable detailed in the office locked the main office from inside.

SPECIALITY:-

HC/GD Rajesh Singh fought without any weapon whereas Balveer Singh was having deadly weapon and was firing indiscriminately. He overpowered Balveer Singh and was able to disarm him. Had HC/GD Rajesh Singh not shown this courage, many more lives would have been lost.

ASI/Exe G. S. Ram also tried to convince Balveer Singh not to kill people but in vain and lost his life.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:-

A. HISTORY:

On 12.01.2017, a guard of 01 head constable and 6 constables were deployed for quarter guard duty from 06.00 hrs for next 24 hrs. As per standing order, one constable was detailed at front side of quarter guard with INSAS rifle and 2 constables were detailed on the rooftop morcha of quarter guard with LMG and INSAS respectively for 3 hours under overall supervision of guard commander (Head Constable/GD). Ex Constable/GD Balveer Singh was detailed from 09.00 to 12.00 hrs along with two other constables. After his duty he was relieved at 12.00 hrs. As there is no separate guard room, the old barrack was being used by off duty guards for taking rest along with other personnel residing in old barrack due to space constraint in new barrack.

Ex. Constable Balveer Singh came to guard room (old barrack) after his duty. He changed his uniform and went to dining hall of new barrack to have his lunch. At around 12.30 hrs, he returned to guard room. At around 12.40 hrs, he fired two rounds from his INSAS rifle on HC/GD Arvind Kumar who had came to old barrack for B shift duty.  Then he came out of old barrack and fired on HC/GD Bachcha Sharma who was standing outside gate of old barrack. HC/GD Bachcha Sharma fell down. Then he further proceeded towards office building and fired two rounds on HC/GD A. N. Mishra who was in front of office for B shift duty. He started indiscriminate firing on CISF personnel who were running to save their lives. Then he again entered the guard room and took his bandolier with remaining 4 magazines. He then rushed towards Assistant Commandant’s office where, ASI/Exe G. S. Ram tried to convince him not to kill CISF personnel but Constable Balveer Singh did not listen to him and opened fire on him and killed him.

B. CHALLENGES:-

  • Bulleted list item

Loss of lives of 04 CISF personnel proved a detrimental blow to the overall morale of the force.

  • Bulleted list item

Loss/damage of arm and ammunitions o  5.56 mm INSAS-01 no. (But no. 56, Reg no. 18405776) - seized by police.

o  Magazine (INSAS)- 01 no. - seized by police.

o  5.56 mm live ammunitions- 12 nos. - seized by police.

o  EFC - 08 nos - seized by police.

o  Live rounds/EFC missing - 16 nos.

  • Bulleted list item

Incidents like these tarnishes the image of the force and leaves an indelible mark on its   professionalism.


C.  LIMITATIONS:

· Shock factor: It was observed that there was a “FREEZE SITUATION”, when the incident of firing began in the unit, in spite of the fact that the unit is in a naxal affected area, the men were not prepared to deal with a situation of an active firing in the barracks by their own companion.

· Lack of clarity in Tactical response: The unit personnel who witnessed the indiscriminate firing first hand were not aware of the tactical response required to handle such a case. Further the lack of clarity in the expected response i.e whether the firer could have been neutralized or  not also aggravated the delay in response from the unit personnel.

CONTENT OF THE CASE:

A. CAUSE:

Court of Inquiry in to the incident was ordered by Inspector General, ES HQRS Patna. The COI was conducted by the board of officers headed by Sh. Shrikant Kishore, DIG CISF, BSL Bokaro (Now DIG and CASO IGI Airport, New Delhi).

After the completion of the court of inquiry it was found that there were no evident reasons or provocation for Constable Balveer Singh to open fire upon his colleagues and kill four persons. There is no obvious reason which could be associated with the killing of four persons by Constable Balveer Singh.

No.082040013 Constable/GD Balveer Singh who is held responsible for killing of 04 innocent CISF personnel on 12-01-2017, attacked the deceased personnel suddenly without rhyme or reason while they were coming for “B” shift duty and were not prepared to counter the attack as they were unarmed. Prior to the incident, Constable Balveer Singh had visited and consulted a Doctor for an issue related with  mental health, while undergoing a Yoga course at RTC Deoli. The staff and medical officer at RTC Deoli had not taken the ailment of the said constable into account seriously and thus did not communicate the same to the CISF Unit Nabinagar. Constable Balveer Singh failed to communicate about his deteriorating mental health from authorities for almost six years fearing a detrimental service and financial implications.

HC/GD Ranjit Bahadur Singh (Guard Commander, Quarter Guard) miserably failed to discharge his duties as Guard Commander as he didn’t even attempt to challenge or counter the attack of Const/GD Balveer Singh. Further he escaped from the Quarter Guard without raising any alarm in the dire situation keeping the lives of other inmates of the Quarter Guard on stake. Similarly, Const/GD Dhananjay Yadav, Const/GD R.K.Jena and Const/GD Narender Singh who were deployed at Quarter Guard with Arms at the time of incident, also failed to challenge/encounter Const/GD Balveer Singh.

Additionally, Shri Ajit Toppo, Asstt Commandant who was looking after the duties of Unit I/C on the date of incident also failed to respond with due diligence in a timely and an appropriate manner.

B. PRECEDENTS:

On dated 12.01.2017 at about 12.40 hrs, Ex Constable Balveer Singh, who was detailed for Quarter Guard duty and was taking rest in old barrack after his duty, opened indiscriminate firing with his 5.56 mm INSAS rifle. Four CISF personnel, who were assembling there for B shift duty were killed in the firing. Later he was overpowered by HC/GD Rajesh Singh.

AC/Exe Sh. Ajit Toppo was holding the temporary charge of unit commander at the time of incident as the unit commander was out of station to attend a course. AC/Exe Sh. Ajit Toppo was inside main office at the time of incident.


UNFOLDINGS OF THE EVENT:

The timing of incident was the shift change timing and due to this the personnel detailed for B shift duty were assembling for the duty. CT/GD Balveer Singh tried to enter every room of new barrack but he could not enter as the rooms were closed from inside. Seeing this, HC/GD Rajesh Singh went to the rooftop of new barrack and decided to confront him on the roof top of new barrack. He came on the roof where HC/GD Rajesh Singh was hiding behind door waiting for him. Constable Balveer Singh broke open the door by hitting it with his leg. HC/GD Rajesh Singh, who was hiding behind the door, caught hold of the barrel of the rifle of Balveer Singh and tried to snatch it. Finally, HC/GD Rajesh Singh overpowered CT/GD Balveer Singh and seized the rifle from CT/GD Balveer Singh.

HOW THE INCIDENT WAS HANDLED:

HC/GD Rajesh Singh went to the rooftop of new barrack and decided to confront him on the roof top of new barrack. He came on the roof where HC/GD Rajesh Singh was hiding behind door waiting for him. Constable Balveer Singh broke open the door by hitting it with his leg. HC/GD Rajesh Singh, who was hiding behind the door, caught hold of the barrel of the rifle of Balveer Singh and tried to snatch it. Finally, HC/GD Rajesh Singh overpowered CT/GD Balveer Singh and seized the rifle from CT/GD Balveer Singh. He was brought down and kept inside company office till the arrival of local police.

After arrival of local police, CT/GDBalveer Singh was handed over to local police and FIR under section 302 of IPC and section 27 of Arms act was lodged. He was arrested and sent to jail by the police. He was placed under suspension vide Group Commandant, GHQ Patna order no. (199) dated 13.01.2017 and subsequently dismissed from service vide Group Commandant GHQ Patna order no. (325) dated 14.01.2017.

Charge sheet in the case was filed by the IO of the case vide charge sheet no. 01/2017 dated 30.01.2017. The case is under trial at present in Aurangabad court.


LEARNING POINTS:

1. The incident happened in front of old quarter guard. One HC/GD (guard commander) and 3 CT/GD were on duty at the time of incident. Out of three CT/GD, two were deployed at the rooftop of quarter guard with LMG and INSAS rifles. One CT/GD was deployed at front morcha of quarter guard which is only 15 to 20 meters from the place where two personnel were killed. On duty personnel of quarter guard failed to take action during the incident.

2. It was observed that there was a “FREEZE SITUATION”, when the incident of firing began in the unit. In spite of the fact that the unit is in a naxal affected area the men were not prepared to deal with a signature of an active firer in the barracks. They could not comprehend that the firer can be amongst their own colleagues and that such kind of situation can happen. All who were around either tried to escape the location or they went into a “FREEZE SITUATION” where the fear made them unable to think about what is happening around them and how to react to the situation.


3. All officers, the guard commander and the guards at the quarter guard went in to “FREEZE SITUATION” and made an ostrich like behavior. This is most common reflexes of a human being when he is confronted with a grave situation like this. But for a trained soldier he needs to come out of freeze situation immediately and he should take evasive and tactical action. Training should be imparted to each personnel how to understand what “freeze situation” are and how to deal with them. The survival of the troop would depend how quickly they can come out of the freeze situation and observe the tactical moves.

4. Shri Ajit Toppo, Asstt Commandant who was looking after Unit IC on the date of incident was present at the spot, also failed to discharge his duty for the reason that when he witnessed the incident, he hide himself in the office chamber along with 07 other office staff.


UNIT LEVEL EFFORTS TO AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS:

1. The personnel deployed at Quarter Guard must not be allowed to take weapon outside the quarter guard and they must stay inside the premises of quarter guard.

2. Arms and ammunition should be deposited after completion of duty in quarter guard. The main reason for the incident was that the individual had the access to weapon and he was not in his area of duty. There is likelihood of the individual to get into a stage of instability or any external factors can trigger his mood to take drastic steps of such nature.

3. Personnel who are undergoing/ undergone treatment of mental depression/ mental or psychiatric disorders, should not be issued weapons. The personnel who are identified to be mentally unstable should be kept away from the weapons. The use of weapon in hands of such personnel would always be dangerous of the safety of self and colleagues.

4. Development of multi layered leadership. There is need to develop a multi level operational and response leadership. This may not confined only to Gazetted officers or rank of Inspectors. The

Leadership skills should be taken to the rank of guard commanders and Sub Inspectors who can take a balanced decision on the ground when faced with actual challenge.

5. A known case of mental illness should be communicated to the mid unit so that there is a track of such personnel and there is an active knowledge of existence of such personnel.

6. Incidents of such nature causes “Freeze reaction”. A SOP be prepared to deal with such type of incident and proper rehearsal/mock drill may also be conducted.

7. Regular interaction among all unit personnel, including sub officers and GO’s, unit commanders.

8. CIW staff should also monitor about whether any CISF personnel is taking any treatment for mental depression/ mental disorder.

DETAILS OF OTHER PERSONS WHO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN HANDLING THE INCIDENT:

1. Late ASI/Exe G. S. Ram

2. HC/GD Rajesh Singh

CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCIDENT INCLUDINMG ACTION TAKEN BY CISF:

Constable Balveer Singh broke open the door by hitting it with his leg. HC/GD Rajesh Singh, who was hiding behind the door, caught hold of the barrel of the rifle of Balveer Singh and tried to snatch it. Finally, he snatched the rifle from Balveer Singh, threw it on the ground and overpowered him. He brought him down and kept him inside company office till the arrival of local police.

At the same time it was found that HC/GD Bachcha Sharma and HC/GD A. N. Mishra died on the spot and ASI/Exe G. S. Ram and HC/GD Arvind Kumar were seriously injured. Both the injured were immediately taken to Narayan Medical College and Hospital, Sasaram for treatment but the doctors declared both of them brought dead. Post mortem of dead bodies was carried out at Sadar Hospital, Aurangabad. After post mortem, the bodies were sent to their native place as per wish of their next of kin.

After arrival of local police, Balveer Singh was handed over to local police and FIR under section 302 of IPC and section 27 of Arms act was lodged. He was arrested and sent to jail by the police. He was placed under suspension vide Group Commandant, GHQ Patna order no. (199) dated 13.01.2017 and subsequently dismissed from service vide Group Commandant GHQ Patna order no.(325) dated 14.01.2017.

Charge sheet in the case was filed by the IO of the case vide charge sheet no. 01/2017 dated 30.01.2017. The case is under trial at present in Aurangabad court.